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in different ways can reduce the level of excessive punishment in a standard VCM-with-punishment environment while 
preserving the norm enforcement properties of punishment. We find that venting emotions reduces (excessive) 
punishment, and under certain conditions the net effect is an increase in final payoffs (i.e., welfare) to the group.
Dickinson, D. L. and D. Masclet (2015). "Emotion venting and punishment in public good experiments." Journal of 
Public Economics 122: 55-67. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.10.008. Publisher version of record available at: 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272714002229
Emotion venting and punishment in public good experimentsDavid L. Dickinson a,⁎, David Masclet b,c,⁎
a Appalachian State University, 416 Howard St., Boone, NC 28608, USA
b CNRS, CREM, 7 Place Hoche, 35065 Rennes, France
c CIRANO, Montréal, Canada⁎ Corresponding authors.
E-mail addresses: dickinsondl@appstate.edu (D.L. Dick
david.masclet@univ-rennes1.fr (D. Masclet).
1 These include preplay communication (Dawes et al., 1
Walker, 1988b, 1991; Ostrom et al., 1992; Kerr a
Krishnamurthy, 2001; Brosig et al., 2003), creation of gro
with post-play open discussion (Gächter and Fehr, 1999)
sign a rating to each of the other group member's contrib
2003).a b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f oKeywords:
Sanctions
Public good
Experiment
Venting emotionsExperimental studies have shown that sanctions effectively deter free riding within groups. However, the over-
use of costly punishment may actually harm overall welfare. A main reason for over-punishment is that free-
riders generate negative emotions that likely favor excessive punishments. In this paper we ask whether the
venting of one's emotions in different ways can reduce the level of excessive punishment in a standard VCM-
with-punishment environment while preserving the norm enforcement properties of punishment. We find
that venting emotions reduces (excessive) punishment, and under certain conditions the net effect is an increase
in final payoffs (i.e., welfare) to the group.1. Introduction
In typical voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) experiments,
free-riding incentives are at oddswith group efficiency. Substantial con-
tributions to the public good are common in VCMgames, but such coop-
erative play decreases as the game is repeated (Isaac et al., 1985;
Andreoni, 1988; Isaac and Walker, 1988a; Ledyard, 1995). In light of
this empirical regularity of declining contributions across periods,
more recent studies have attempted to identify modifications to the
game that may increase cooperation.1 Of particular interest to the pres-
ent paper is the use of sanctions as a norm enforcement tool to deter
free riding within groups (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Carpenter, 2007a,
b; Masclet et al., 2003; Noussair and Tucker, 2005; Bochet et al., 2006;
Anderson and Putterman., 2006; Sefton et al., 2007; Carpenter, 2007a,
b; Egas and Riedl, 2008; Gächter et al., 2008; Nikiforakis, 2008;
Nikiforakis and Normann., 2008; Engelmann and Nikiforakis, 2012).
These studies have shown that sanctioning is effective in deterringinson),
977; Isaac et al., 1985; Isaac and
nd Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994;
up identification in conjunction
, and having each individual as-
ution decisions (Masclet et al.,free riding. However, while the introduction of sanctioning significantly
improves cooperation, it may also harmoverall welfare because punish-
ment is costly and reduces both the punisher's and target's payoff.
The short-run net effect of punishment is to reduce welfare, al-
though punishment may increase welfare if the horizon is sufficiently
long (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Gächter et al., 2008). However, a concern
with punishment is that people may over-punish due to the negative
emotions generated by free riders. In other words, negative reciprocity
can be disproportionate relative to what is efficient if it results from
an emotionally excessive reaction (i.e., punishment will not “fit the
crime”). Efficiency requires punishment intended for deterrence with
emotionally excessive punishment removed.
The focus of our paper is to study whether the venting of one's emo-
tions might reduce excessive punishment while preserving cooperative
incentives created by the punishment mechanism. Allowing people to
express their negative emotions may help restrain aggressive punish-
ment by providing an alternative opportunity to vent one's own frustra-
tion. This is related to the catharsis theory perspective in psychology
(Feshbach and Singer, 1971; Lee, 1993). The process of venting emo-
tions is rather complex. One may vent emotions in many different
ways, from simply taking a “time out” to distance oneself from the neg-
ative stimulus,2 to another extreme where one is allowed the opportu-
nity to even “violently” release negative emotions in a controlled2 This is based on the idea that emotional states are temporary (see Ekman, 1994;
Loewenstein, 2000).
4 Our paper is related to Bushman et al. (1999) who investigated whether reading ca-
thartic messages and hitting a punching bag were effective means to vent anger. The au-
thors observed that individuals were even more aggressive after reading the cathartic
messages and hitting a punching bag compared to the control group, which directly con-
tradicts the catharsis theory. Bushman (2002) also showed that doing nothing seems to be
themost effectiveway to reduce the intensity of anger. Our current paper differs from the-
se two experiments in psychology in thewaywe control the environment in the laborato-
ry, our introduction of monetary incentives, and our generation of emotion data using a
simple elicitation procedure.
5 Our paper ismost closely related to Bolle et al. (2014), who observe that venting emo-
tions reduces aggression in a vendetta game. Our paper differs from this previous study in
our investigation of the effects of venting emotions in a context of a social dilemma and
not the occurrence of vendetta (i.e., personally-directed retaliatory punishment, which
is precluded in our design given blind subject identities). Furthermore our study differs
from this previous study in our use of multiple ways to vent emotions, which allows us
to compare the relative effectiveness of different ways to vent emotions. Our paper is also
closely related to Xiao andHouser (2005). Xiao andHouser (2005)find that cooperation is
higher when individuals are given the opportunity to express their emotions in less ex-
pensive ways than through punishment. In Xiao and Houser (2005), responders in an ul-
timatum game can express emotions by sending a message to proposers at no cost, and
they find that this significantly reduces the rejection rates on unfair offers. However, theirenvironment. There is evidence that venting emotions is desirable, and
even some examples of formalizing the venting process. “Venting
rooms” are places that allow individuals to vent their negative emotions
by screaming, smashing dishes, destroying a T.V. with a baseball bat, or
basically demolishing anything in the room with impunity (recent ex-
amples are found in US, Bosnia, China, and Japan).3 In some cases,
stand-alone venting room businesses charge a fee to the privilege of
demolishing stuff. The fact that individuals are willing to pay a fee to
vent emotions attests to its perceived usefulness for emotional health.
A more straightforward workplace application, where worker effort
can be considered a contribution towards a public good, would be to
recognize that decisions made in hot emotional states can be subopti-
mal (e.g., excessive workplace discipline).
Could the introduction of emotion venting opportunities increase
welfare? One may reasonably conjecture that allowing people to vent
their emotions will reduce excessive sanctions, leading to reduced pun-
ishment and positive effects on welfare. This is particularly important
given that punishment seems to primarily result from a personal desire
to express dissatisfaction through punishment, as opposed to a desire to
deter free riding through strategic punishment efforts (Casari and Luini,
2012; Duersch andMüller, 2013; Ouss and Peysakhovich, 2013). On the
other hand, the introduction of venting emotions may have a negative
net effect on welfare if the reduction in punishment also reduces the
strategic punishment necessary to limit free riding.
Emotions have been traditionally absent from the economic analysis
(but also from the pre-1960 literature in psychology) given the fact that
they had long been considered the antithesis of rational decisions (see
Kaufman, 1999, for a discussion), with a few exceptions (e.g., Frank,
1988; Elster, 1998). This sharply contrasts with the contemporary
viewof the role of emotions in economics, psychology, aswell as in neu-
roscience. In the current view, emotions are not in opposition to reason
but instead provide essential support to the reasoning process that
guides human decisions towards particular ends (e.g. Damasio, 1994).
Furthermore, it has been argued that optimal decisions require an inter-
mediate level of emotional arousal (Yates, 1990), thus highlighting the
role that emotions may play in decision efficiency. The intuition is that
too little emotional intensity is sub-optimal because it inhibits decisions,
while too much emotional arousal is also detrimental to efficiency be-
cause it induces loss of control and excessive reactions.
In this paper we report results from experiments that supplement a
standard VCMpunishment environment (Fehr and Gächter, 2000) with
several treatments that allow players to vent their emotions prior to
making punishment decisions. The treatments we administer each
adds additional opportunities to vent emotions: we start with a simple
cooling off period, but then add the opportunity to self-report one's
emotional state as well as assign virtual punishment points. We find
that venting emotions can increase efficiency under certain condition,
over and above what punishment itself may accomplish. The venting-
emotion treatments lead individuals to assign significantly less punish-
ment points to others compared to a treatmentwithout the opportunity
to vent emotions. The reduction in punishment leads to reduced contri-
butions, which highlights the deterrence value of punishment, but we
find that the net effect of a simple cooling-off period to vent emotions
can still be an increase in overall long-run welfare.
Our paper is related to previous studies that have investigated thebe-
havioral impact of emotions on punishment decisions. It is known that
emotional processes are involved in the decision to punish in two-
person interactions. In particular, anger accompanies the application of
costly punishment (Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Ben Shakhar et al.,3 For instance, see anger rooms in Texas (http://www.cbc.ca/news/offbeat/story/2012/
03/09/video-anger-room.html), in Japan (http://healthehelen.wordpress.com/tag/anger-
rooms/ or in Bosnia http://www.thehimalayantimes.com/fullNews.php?headline=
Serbians+pay+to+vent+anger+in+Rage+Room+&NewsID=362269). There also ex-
ists some smart phone applications that could be considered tools to vent emotions such
as Angry Birds or games that allow you to shoot or smash things (although there is debate
whether in extreme cases this may promote real violence for those with predispositions).2007; Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2009; Joffily et al., 2014). It has also
been shown that when observing opportunistic behavior, anterior insula
activation, which is typically associated with aversive stimuli, correlates
with subsequent individuals' decision to punish others (Sanfey et al.,
2003). Punishment of social norm violators has been found to increase
positive self-reported emotional state satisfaction (Joffily et al., 2014),
and punishment activates the dorsal striatum, a brain area often associ-
ated with pleasant stimuli and reward-driven actions (De Quervain
et al., 2004). While punishing free riders activates reward centers in
the brain, Andreoni's (1990) concept of a “warm glow” from giving im-
plies that cooperation should also trigger reward center activation. In-
deed, striatum activation has been associated with mutually
cooperative behavior in prisoner's dilemma games (Rilling et al., 2002,
2004). In a recent work, Drouvelis and Grosskopf (2014) used short
video clips to induce happiness and anger in a one-shot VCM environ-
ment. They found that angry subjects punished more than others,
while happy subjects contributed more than angry subjects.
The originality of our paper is fourfold. First, we investigate the im-
pact of venting emotions on punishment.While several studies have in-
vestigated the behavioral impact of emotions on punishment decisions,
only a few studies have investigated the behavioral impact of venting
emotions on punishment (Bushman et al., 1999; Bushman, 2002; Bolle
et al, 2014; Xiao and Houser;, 2005), and the results are somewhat
mixed. Some studies found no effect of venting emotions (Bushman
et al., 1999; Bushman, 2002)4 while others observed a positive effect
of venting (e.g. Bolle et al., 2014; Xiao and Houser, 2005).5 Our design
better isolates the emotion venting effect, which is somewhat con-
founded in these previous studies given how they involve shared
venting information. The purpose of this experiment is therefore to con-
tribute to the resolution of the debate about whether venting emotions
has an effect on punishment decisions. Secondly, our design allows us to
vary the level of venting emotions from a simple cooling off period to
more complete emotion venting that includes self-reporting one's emo-
tional state and assigning virtual punishment points. We can therefore
study whether some venting treatments affect punishment/contribu-
tion decisions more than others. To our knowledge no previous study
has done this.
Thirdly, we investigate not only the effect of venting emotions on
punishment but also its effect on welfare (i.e., efficiency). Indeed we
conjecture that theremay exist an optimal interior level of venting emo-
tions corresponding to higher efficiency. Our intuition is that too littlepaper does not implement “virtual punishment” in the same sense we do, given the infor-
mation communicated to other subjects in their design. Our current paper differs from
theirs in the way our message venting remains private information. All of these help us
to isolate the pure emotion venting effect. It is also the case that sendingwrittenmessages
may convey a nonpecuniary punishment that may influence decisions. For instance, one
may reasonably argue that written messages in Xiao and Houser (2005) may increase
the proposer's offer as a result of, or in anticipation of, the social cost of disapproval of un-
fair offers (see Masclet et al., 2003).
Table 1
Characteristics of the experimental sessions.
Session number #Subjects #Groups Treatment Stage I Stage II Stage III
1 24 6 Baseline Contribution – Punishment
2 12 3 Baseline Contribution – Punishment
3 24 6 Waiting Contribution Waiting Punishment
4 24 6 Waiting emotion Contribution Waiting & emotions Punishment
5 24 6 Virtual punish Contribution Virtual punish + waiting & emotions Punishment
Total 108 27venting of emotions may lead to excessive and costly emotion-based
punishment. In contrast, venting too much emotion may harm welfare
if it limits the use of punishment as a deterrent. This intuition is based
on the Yerkes–Dodson law in psychology—first identified in Yerkes
and Dodson (1908)—that posits a non-linear relationship between
emotional arousal and performance. Finally, our findings suggest that
the existence of an optimal level of punishment requires an optimal
level of emotions. When emotions are low or absent, subjects behave
as homo-economicus who never punishes, which is inefficient. In con-
trast, excess emotions lead to overreaction and excessive punishment,
which is also inefficient.
2. The experiment
2.1. The treatments
Our experiment consists of four treatments summarized in Table 1.
Our baseline treatment is based on a design used in Fehr and Gächter
(2000). Participants interact during 10 periods under a partner
matching protocol.6 Each period of the Baseline treatment has two
stages. At the beginning of stage one, each member of a 4-player
group receives an endowment of 20 ECU, an experimental currency
convertible to Euros, to allocate between a private account and a
group account. No player can observe any other player's contribution
decision before he makes his own choice. Each ECU that any group
member allocates to the group account yields 0.4 ECU to each member
of the group. The payoff of subject i, at the end of the first stage, πi1,
equals:
π1i ¼ 20−cið Þ þ 0:4
X4
j¼1
c j ð1Þ
where ci is player i's contribution to the group account. The more ECUs
an individual allocates to the group account, the lower her own earnings
are but the greater the group's earnings are. For this reason, allocations
to the group account are referred to as contributions and are considered
a proxy for cooperation.
Each participant is then informed of her first-stage payoff, the total
contribution of the group, and the individual contribution of each of
the three othermembers of her group. In stage two, she has an opportu-
nity to assign punishment points to each of the other members of her
group. Players could not observe any other's punishment decision at
the time she made her choices. Punishment points assigned to any
given groupmember could be in the [0,10] range.We use a fine:punish-
ment ratio of 1:3, whereby each point assigned costs one ECU to the
punisher and reduces the target player's payoff by 3 ECUs. Therefore,
player i's payoff after the second stage is given by:
π2i ¼ π1i −ε∑ j≠ipi2j −∑ j≠ip j2i ð2Þ6 To avoid reputation effects across periods, participantswere associatedwith a letter of
the alphabet, A, ⋯ ,D that was randomly changed after each period. An individual's activity
was displayed in a different position on other groupmembers' screens indifferent periods.
This made it impossible for an individual to track another player's behavior from period to
period.where pij2 is the number of points i assigns to j in stage 2, and the pun-
ishment penalty parameter, ε, equals 3 (note also that superscripts 1
and 2 refer to stages 1 and 2).7
The Waiting treatment is identical to the Baseline except that a
cooling off period of fiveminutes is included after observation of contri-
bution levels and before the punishment stage. During this cooling off
period, the subjects have nothing to do. The Waiting & Emotion treat-
ment is identical to the Waiting treatment except that each participant
has the opportunity to express his/her emotions during the 5-minute
waiting period by indicating (on a scale of 1–7) their self-reported
level anger, joy, and surprise regarding each of the other group
member's contribution levels. Subjects are also allowed a text-boxwith-
in which they may anonymously type messages to the other subjects
within their group, but with the common knowledge that these mes-
sages are never sent (i.e., these messages cannot have any implication
for behavior, in contrast to other studies).
Finally, theVirtual Punishment treatment is identical to theWaiting&
Emotion treatment except that an additional stage is included after the
contribution stage and before the waiting phase. In this additional
stage, each player was required to assign virtual punishment points in
the [0,10] range to each of the othermembers of her group. The subjects
were informed that these punishment points were nonbinding in the
sense that they could be modified after the waiting phase, and they
were also private information since they were not communicated to
the other players. After virtual punishment points were assigned, the
players were required to wait for 5 min. Participants gave self-
reported emotion ratings during this 5-minute waiting period, and af-
terwards were required to submit their choices for the actual costly
punishment points.
In all treatments, assuming that players maximize their own earn-
ings, the subgame perfect equilibrium is complete free riding (i.e., zero
contributions) and zero punishment. The marginal per capita return of
the public good is always lower than the marginal return of keeping
one's own endowment for oneself, which generates the free riding the-
oretical prediction. In contrast, the socially optimal behavior is to con-
tribute one's full endowment to the public good, since 0.4*n N 1. In the
treatment with virtual punishment points, any virtual punishment pro-
file is compatible with the subgame perfect equilibrium, because virtual
punishment points are non-binding, private information, and the equi-
librium is unique. Equilibrium in all treatments involves zero costly
punishment because assigning punishment always reduces the payoff
of the punisher (see Appendix A online for experimental instructions).2.2. Behavioral predictions
Our key hypothesis is based on the conjecture that allowing people
to vent their emotions will reduce excessive sanctions, and thus reduce
punishment levels. A suitable framework to describe our predictions
must recognize the impact of emotion as well as rational deliberation
in decision making. For example, a dual-system framework con-
siders that both more automatic (system 1) and more deliberate7 This punishment price is common in the literature and reflects an intermediate pun-
ishment price among those studied in Anderson and Putterman (2006).
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Fig. 1. Emotional arousal and efficiency.
9 The original Y–K law (Yerkes and Dodson, 1908) considers that simple task perfor-
mance may still benefit from high levels of arousal. However, the VCM-punishment envi-
ronment we study would be sufficiently complex as to relate to the complex task version
of the Y–K law that posits a non-monotonic arousal–performance relationship, as is typi-
cally shown in textbooks.
10 Psychologists have attempted to identify the different factors that may explain the
inverted U-shape between emotional arousal and performance (e.g. Forgas, 1995). Inhibi-
tion that prevents expression of emotion may be inimical to quality decision making.
When emotional intensity increases (at least up to some point), emotions may reduce
the barriers of inhibition and enhance engagement. However, beyond some point in-(system 2) decision processes can play a role in decision making.8
System 1 would be responsible for impulsive decisions of the sort that
may result fromahot emotional state. Excessive emotion-based punish-
ment would be this sort of impulsive decision in our experiments. On
the other hand, deliberate thought, which may include input from
non-impulsive emotion, would be responsible for the rest of one's
punishment choice.
Emotion venting is aimed at reducing the emotional impulse to pun-
ish excessively. Thismay be accomplished by forcing the decisionmaker
to wait beyond the impulsive time frame when making a punishment
decision. Alternatively, allowing one to express or release emotions
(rather than letting themdissipate over time)may also reduce the emo-
tions prior to one's punishment decision. What remains an empirical
question is whether venting may also reduce emotions to an extent
that the remaining decisions are too close to homoeconomicus decisions,
which in our experiments would imply inefficiently low punishment.
Nevertheless, this framework applied to our experiment predicts less
punishment compared to the baseline in each of the treatments that
allow emotion venting,with the greatest reduction in punishment in in-
stances where there exist themost opportunities to vent emotions. This
is described in H1.
H1. Punishment should decrease in the number of avenues to vent emo-
tions. The predicted ordering of punishment points assigned across treat-
ment is:Baseline N Waiting N Waiting & Emotion N Virtual Punishment.
Our second conjecture is that individuals may experience emotions
when observing the others' contributions relative to one's own contri-
butions. Based on previous studies identified in Section 1, we hypothe-
size that observing high contributions may induce positive emotions in
the anticipation of higher own-payoffs. In contrast, observing free-
riding may induce negative emotion. This is stated as our second
hypothesis.
H2. Observing free riding induces negative emotions, while observing co-
operative behavior induces positive emotions.
Our next hypothesis concerns the role of emotions in the decision to
punish. Twonon-strategicmotives are generally evoked in the literature
to explain why subjects are willing to sacrifice payoffs to punish others:
a reaction to unfair intentions and distributional concerns. These two
motives presumably have emotional underpinnings. We conjecture
that individuals who have been more negatively emotionally aroused
when learning others' low contributionsmay be more willing to punish
free-riders. This conjecture is summarized in H3.
H3. The more individuals are (negatively) emotionally aroused when
learning free riding, the more punishment points they will assign.
Finally our last hypothesis concerns the effects of venting emotions
on welfare. We conjecture that the relationship between venting emo-
tions and efficiency may be non-linear. Specifically, in the absence of
venting (i.e., Baseline) excessive emotion-based punishment may in-
duce important welfare costs. This may be consistent with previous
studies that have shown that being in a negative mood is detrimental
for the subject's overall welfare as measured by average net earnings
(e.g. Drouvelis and Grosskopf, 2014).
In contrast, venting too much emotions, which may be the case in a
treatment like Virtual Punishment, may also lead to inefficiency by in-
ducing too little punishment (i.e. inefficiently low deterrence). Conse-
quently we conjecture that there may exist an optimal level of venting
emotions in terms of welfare corresponding to the moderate venting8 Such frameworks in the literature include: Schneider and Shiffrin (1977), Camerer
et al. (2005), and Kahneman (2011), and neural evidence shows that different parts of
the brain activate with system 1 versus system 2 thinking (Goel et al., 2000).treatments (i.e.Waiting andWaiting & Emotion treatments). We cannot
predictwhich of these two venting treatmentswill be themost efficient,
only that intermediate levels of venting may be more efficient than ei-
ther extreme. Our conjecture is based on the Yerkes–Dodson (Y–K)
law in psychology that posits an inverted U-shape relationship between
emotional arousal (i.e. the intensity level of a specific emotion, such as
anger) and performance (i.e. performance in a particular task or deci-
sion). This relationship is depicted in Fig. 1 (the “Hebbian” version of
the law: Hebb, 1955).9
According to this law, too little emotional intensity would be ineffi-
cient as it leads to absence of reaction due to inhibition which may be
detrimental (see E1 in Fig. 1). As emotional intensity increases, perfor-
mance improves until an optimal point is reached (E2). Beyond this op-
timal point, additional emotional intensity becomes counterproductive
to performance due to loss of control and excessive reactions of violence
and/or aggression (E3). Several laboratory experiments confirm the ex-
istence of this inverted U-shape relationship (e.g., Ascraft and Faust,
1994). Some economists have also introduced the Yerkes–Dodson law
into economic theory (e.g., Leibenstein, 1987; Kaufman, 1999).10 This
leads to our fourth hypothesis.
H4. Welfare, net of punishment costs, will be maximized when emotions
are vented to an intermediate level. That is,we hypothesize lower efficiency
in Baseline and Virtual Punishment than our intermediate venting
treatments.
2.3. The parameters of the experiment
The experiment consists of 6 sessions conducted at the LABEX facil-
ity of the Center for Research in Economics andManagement (CREM), atcreased emotional intensitymay be counterproductive as it causes a deterioration of deci-
sionmaking. The reasonmay be that excessive emotionsmay disrupt the agent's ability to
determine optimal outcomes, may block out rational cost-benefit considerations, or may
cause some relative loss of control and promote acts of excessive aggression and violence
(e.g. Lazarus, 1991; see also Kaufman, 1999, for a discussion).
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Fig. 2. Frequency of punishment in each treatment.the University of Rennes I (Rennes, France). Informed consent was
obtained from all subjects prior to the start of the experiment. The 108
participants were recruited from various undergraduate courses. No
subject participated in more than one session, which involves just one
treatment of 10 periods. Thus, this is a between-subject design regard-
ing the emotion venting treatments. The experiment was computerized
using the Ztree software package (Fischbacher, 2007), and conducted in
French. On average, participants earned 12.10 Euros, including a €3
show-up fee.0
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3.1. Punishment choice and intensity of punishment
Fig. 2 displays the frequency of total punishment points assigned by
each individual subject towards the three other groupmembers in each
treatment.11 Though themodal punishment is zero, punishment is nev-
ertheless widely employed in all treatments. Compared to Baseline, it
also appears that individuals punish lesswhen they have the opportuni-
ty to vent their emotions. Subjects punish at least to some extent in
45.27% of all subject decision rounds in the Baseline treatment (163 ob-
servations out of 360). Punishments are made in 37.91% of theWaiting
treatment decision rounds (91/240 observations), and punishment is
even lower when one can additionally express emotions: 27.91%
(67/240) and 30.41% (73/240) of the time in the Waiting & Emotion
and Virtual Punishment treatments, respectively. Our data also indicate
that the degree of punishment is less severe in each of the emotion-
venting treatment compared to Baseline. These emotion venting
treatments each imposes a common 5-minute cooling off period, but
the additional emotion venting opportunities seem effective to some11 See the Appendix A online for full distributions of individual punishment points
pooled across periods (Fig. A1), and for average subject contributions and punishment
choices in a given period separated by experiment group (Tables A1 and A2). These tables
show the heterogeneity of behavior across groups, and this heterogeneity remains even in
the final 5 periods of play.extent as well. Fig. 3 displays the evolution of average punishment
points across treatments over the course of the 10 decision rounds.
Both Figs. 2 and 3 show that introducing the opportunity to vent
emotions seems to promote reduced punishment. The average number
of costly (real) punishment points assigned by each subject to all other
group members in each treatment is: 1.62 (Baseline), 1.15 (Waiting),
1.23 (Waiting & Emotion), and 0.67 (Virtual Punishment). Pooling all pe-
riods, nonparametric tests on average punishment levels of each group
(Mann–Whitney tests, unless otherwise specified) indicate significantly
lower levels of punishment in Virtual Punishment compared to Baseline
(p = .06), but no significant differences otherwise (p N .10). If one fo-
cuses on thefinal five periods of behavior, non-parametric tests indicate
significantly fewer average punishment points assigned in the Waiting
& Emotions versus Baseline (p = .07) and Virtual Punishment versus
Baseline (p = .07). Average punishment points in Waiting are less
than those in Baseline, but the difference is statistically insignificantPeriod
Baseline Waiting
Waiting & emotion Virtual punishment
Fig. 3. Punishment decision over time in each treatment.
Table 2
Determinants of total individual punishment (RE Tobit models).
Dep var = costly punishment points assigned
Variable (1) (2)
Waiting −0.92
(0.99)
−1.16
(0.98)
Waiting & Emotion −1.78*
(1.012)
−1.78*
(1.02)
Virtual Punishment −1.88*
(1.00)
−2.11**
(1.01)
Period −0.59***
(0.06)
−0.59***
(0.06)
Final period 2.77***
(0.60)
2.78***
(0.60)
Demographics No Yes
Constant 2.01**
(0.687)
8.25**
(2.61)
Observations 1080 1080
Log likelihood −985.52 −1437.02
Lef cens. obs. 686 686
Notes: ***Significant at the 0.01 level, **at the 0.05 level, and *at the 0.1 level.
Standard errors are in parentheses.(p N .10). We supplement these tests with controlled analysis below to
justify our first result, which largely supports H1.
Result 1. Punishment is used in all treatments. However, subjects punish
significantly less in the treatments in which people can vent their emotions.
Statistical support for result 1 is found in Tables 2 and 3. In Table 2
the dependent variable is the punishment points assigned by a subject
to all other group members combined. We use random effect Tobit
models to account for censoring at zero and multiple observations per
subjects. In addition to treatment dummies, we include a variable for
the decision period, a dummy for the final decision period, and column
(2) estimates include demographic controls (gender, education level,
dummies for university and economics students).Table 3
Determinant subject-specific punishment (random effect Tobit models).
Treatments
Included →
All All (period 1 only) All
RE Tobit Tobit HECKIT
Intensity Prob
Dep var →
Variable
Pi,j Pi,j Pi,j Pi,j =
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Waiting −0.35
(0.57)
−0.62
(0.49)
−0.64
(0.43)
−0.0
(0.23
Waiting & Emotion −0.52
(0.59)
−0.46
(0.50)
−0.02
(0.45)
−0.1
(0.24
Virtual Punishment −1.27**
(0.60)
−2.06***
(0.56)
−0.95*
(0.50)
−0.4
(0.22
Anger – – – –
Surprise – – – –
Pos dev avg −0.10***
(0.031)
−0.17***
(0.06)
– −0.0
(0.02
|NEG dev| avg 0.39***
(0.02)
0.31***
(0.05)
– 0.17*
(0.02
Average contribution −0.01
(0.02)
−0.12*
(0.06)
– 0.01
(0.01
Period −0.21***
(0.03)
– −0.02
(0.03)
−0.0
(0.02
Final period 0.814***
(0.27)
– 0.63*
(0.36)
0.24
(0.15
Constant 2.01
(1.57)
5.70***
(1.60)
4.17***
(1.19)
0.48
(0.47
Observations 3240 324 3240 3240
Notes: ***Significant at the 0.01 level, **at the 0.05 level, and *at the 0.1 level. Standard errors
Errors in the Heckit models are clustered at the individual level. In estimates 5–7, we did not iEach of the emotion venting treatment is estimated to have a nega-
tive effect on the total punishment points that a subject assigns to others
in her group, and the estimated effect becomes larger in magnitude and
more precisely estimated and statistically significant when additional
venting options are added to the basic cooling off period in theWaiting
treatment. Consistent with hypothesis H1, adding the ability to express
emotions inWaiting & Emotion significantly reduces punishment points
assigned compared to justWaiting (and Baseline), and allowing subjects
to assign virtual punishment points in the emotionally “hot” moment
following the revelation of others' contribution decisions (Virtual Pun-
ishment) further reduces eventual actual punishment points. Overall av-
erage levels of virtual punishment points are greater than average actual
punishment levels in six of the ten periods, and they are equal in the
other four (see online Appendix Figure A2).
We also model the choice to punish each individual member of one's
group in a series of estimations in Table 3, where the dependent variable,
Pi,j, measures the punishment points player i assigns to player j in her
group in each period. In addition to the independent variables used in
Table 2,we also include variables tomeasure the effect of positive or neg-
ative deviations (measured in absolute value) of player j's contribution
from the remaining group average, andwe control for the average contri-
bution level of the entire group. Column (2) replicates column (1) using
only Period=1 data, where concerns of endogeneity are completely ab-
sent (i.e., no previous history of contribution or punishment). Columns
(1) and (2) of Table 2 are estimated as random effect Tobit models.
Columns (1) and (2) show negative coefficient estimates on all
treatments that allow emotion venting, confirming the fact that subjects
punish less in the treatments in which people can vent their emotions.
However, only the coefficients onVirtual Punishment are statistically sig-
nificant, which confirms that extra avenues for venting emotions reduce
punishment more. The coefficient estimates on the venting emotion
treatment in Table 3 can be thought of as away to distinguish emotional
from rational punishment, though we cannot go so far as to say Virtual
Punishment all but rational punishment because some level of emotion
likely still remains even in this treatment.Emotion Venting treatments Emotion venting treatments
HECKIT
it selection RE Tobit Intensity Probit selection
0,1 Pi,j Pi,j Pi,j = 0,1
(5) (6) (7)
6
)
– – –
0
)
Ref. group Ref. group Ref. group
9**
3)
−0.86
(0.74)
−0.74**
(0.31)
−0.38
(0.24)
0.33***
(0.07)
−0.03
(0.06)
0.14***
(0.04)
0.04
(0.06)
0.07
(0.04)
−0.01***
(0.03)
1
)
−0.05
(0.06)
– 0.00
(0.03)
**
)
0.30***
(0.05)
– 0.10***
(0.02)
)
−0.02
(0.04)
– 0.03***
(0.02)
6***
)
−0.31***
(0.06)
−0.02
(0.07)
−0.09***
(0.03)
)
1.60***
(0.53)
1.56*
(0.84)
0.35
(0.28)
3)
1.87
(2.43)
3.57**
(1.14)
0.11
(0.76)
1440 1440 1440
are in parentheses.
nclude “Joy” due to colinearity with anger and surprise.
Table 4
Determinants of player i Emotions (Random Effect Tobit Models).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Angeri,j Joyi,j Surprisei,j Angeri,j Joyi,j Surprisei,j
Waiting & Emotion Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Virtual Punishment 0.61 0.71 0.46 0.37 0.81 0.57
(0.99) (0.66) (1.08) (0.98) (0.68) (1.09)
Period -0.08* -0.08*** -0.46*** -0.06 -0.08*** -0.47***
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Final Period -0.34 0.39 -0.36 -0.46 0.50** -0.36
(0.45) (0.25) (0.57) (0.43) (0.25) (0.57)
|Neg Dev| Avg 0.66*** -0.74*** 0.15***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Pos Dev Avg -0.61*** 0.44*** 0.35***
(0.06) (0.02) (0.04)
Average Contribution -0.34*** 0.41*** 0.16***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Pos Dev i to j -0.55*** 0.45*** 0.28***
(0.05) (0.02) (0.04)
|Neg| Dev i to j 0.69*** -0.71*** 0.07**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Contribution of i -0.38*** 0.44*** 0.19***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Constant 4.89 -4.84** -3.32 6.04* -5.56** -3.78
(3.28) (2.17) (3.55) (3.22) (2.19) (3.54)
Observations 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440
Number of subjects 48 48 48 48 48 48
Notes: *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; *at the 0.1 level. Standard errors in parenthesis.The variables Period and Final Period estimate similar effects as in
Table 2—punishment declines across periods except for the final period
end-game effect of increasedpunishment. Not surprisingly, players con-
tributing less than the group average are punished more while players
contributing more than the group average are punished less. This pat-
tern is consistent with H3 and in agreement with previous studies
(e.g., see Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Masclet et al., 2003; Nikiforakis, and
Normann., 2008; Nikiforakis, 2008; Bochet et al., 2006; Bochet and
Putterman, 2009). Average group contributions also reduce punishment
points assigned to a specific player, ceteris paribus.
The estimations in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 present the results
of a two-stage Heckit estimation to examine both the extensive margin
(i.e., choosing to punish or not), aswell as the intensivemargin choice of
howmany punishment points to assign (column (5)). For these estima-
tions, we include the contribution level and difference variables in
the selection equation but not the punishment intensity equation. The
Heckit estimate results are qualitatively similar to the previous Tobit
results, and they indicate that the most comprehensive emotion
venting treatment, Virtual Punishment, decreases punishment on both
the extensive and intensive margins. The remaining estimates in Table 3
included self-reported emotions as co-variates, which we discuss in
the next section.
Altogether, these findings in columns (1)–(4) of Table 3, along with
Table 2, indicate that venting emotions seems to play a role in reducing
punishment. We therefore turn our attention to an analysis of the self-
reported emotion data generated in the Waiting & Emotion and Virtual
Punishment treatments.3.2. The effects of contributions on emotions
In this subsectionwe investigatewhether observing contributions of
others may trigger negative or positive emotions. If we consider that
other individuals' contribution levels are what determine varied levels
of self-reported emotions, one might more properly analyze emotions
as dependent variables. In doing so, we find that contributions of a
groupmember j relative to the remaining groupmembers, -j, or relative
to subject i are significant determinants of self-reported anger and joy,
consistent with our hypothesis H2. This is our second result.Result 2. Individuals experience less joy and more anger when others free
ride. Surprise results when a groupmember contributes differently from the
group average.
For statistical support of Result 2, Table 4 shows estimates of
separate random effect Tobit models for each of the three self-
reported emotion levels experienced at the moment of observing
others' contributions in the Emotion & Waiting and Virtual Punishment
treatments. The dependent variable in model (1) is how angry player i
feels towards player j. The independent variables include the average
contribution of others (not including player i), the positive difference
between player j's contribution and the average contribution of all
others, or the absolute value of the negative difference between player
j's contribution and the average contributions of others (i.e., if player j
contributes less than the remaining group average). The treatment
dummy for Virtual Punishment captures any difference between the
two treatments where emotions are elicited. As before, the regressions
also include a time trend, a control for end-game effects, and several de-
mographics (not reported here but available upon request). Columns
(2) and (3) in Table 4 represent similar models where joy and surprise,
respectively, are the dependent variables. Finally, models (4)–(6) repli-
cate (1)–(3) using “contribution of player i” as an alternative point of
reference for the contribution level and difference variables. All results
are robustwhen using either player i's contribution levels or the average
of all players except j as the reference contribution level for determining
player i's emotions.
Model (1) shows that the more another group member contrib-
utes relative to the remainder of the group, the less anger is
expressed. On the other hand, observing that player j contributes
less than the average triggers anger. Model (2), not surprisingly,
shows opposite findings regarding joy. Model (3) indicates that any
deviation from the average generate surprise. All results are replicat-
ed in models (4)–(6). Table 4 also shows evidence of a “warm glow”
of contributing given the positive and statistically significant coeffi-
cient on Contribution of i in model (5), and a warm glow of contribu-
tions in general as seen in the Average Contribution” coefficient
estimate in model (2). The statistically insignificant coefficient on
Virtual Punishment, indicates a common level of emotion in these
two treatments at the time of reporting, holding all else equal.
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Fig. 4. Punishment decision and intensity of emotion (Waiting & Emotion and Virtual Punishment treatments).
12 A reviewer noted that individuals who enjoy contributing (unconditional coopera-
tors) or receiving contributions (unconditional cooperators) may generate a systematic
downward trend in punishment in a partner design, unrelated to emotion venting effects.
While this may be true, we control for any such effects by virtue of our Period variable that
captures and time-specific trend in the punishment data. Additionally, these arguments
would apply to all of our treatments, and so our estimated significant effects across treat-
ments are still meaningful as seen Figs. 3 and 5. In a similar vein, the reviewer noted that
time spent in the experiment differs significantly between treatments that include a wait
period versus the baseline, and this may result in fatigue that affects punishment choice
independent of emotion venting. While there is an overall time difference in treatments
(emotion venting adds a 5-minute wait to each period compared to Baseline), when com-
paring results of Waiting and Emotion & Waiting—these two treatments are identical in
time per period—we still find significant differences as noted in Table 2 (and later in
Table 5).
13 In additional estimations (not reported here but available on request) we replicated
estimate (5) of Table 3 by including interaction variables “Virtual Punishment * Anger”
and “Virtual Punishment * Surprise”. Our findings are unchanged (consistent with the lack
of significant difference in emotion ratings across treatment in Table 4).3.3. The relationship between emotions and punishment
Having shown support for H2, we now examine the role of emotions
in the decision to punish. Fig. 4 compares the difference in frequency of
self-reported emotion levels for individuals choosing to punish or not
punish other groupmembers. Recall that self-reported emotions are elic-
ited after contribution decisions are made, but before punishment is
assessed. These graphs indicate that higher self-reported “joy” ratings
are associated with decisions to not punish, while higher ratings of
“surprise” and particularly “anger” are associated with punishment
decisions. These findings are consistent with H3, and lead to Result 3.
Result 3. Self-reported emotions predict punishment decisions.
Support for Result 3 is found in Fig. 4 and columns (5)–(7) of Table 3.
Fig. 4 shows the percentage of those reporting a positive level of anger is
71.05% among the punishers and only 28.71% among those who chose
not to punish. In contrast, self-reported joy is negatively correlated
with punishment decisions—those reporting positive levels of joy rep-
resent 64.11% of the non-punisher subjects compared to 39.47% of
those choosing to punish. Anger and joy are significantly negatively cor-
related (Spearman's rho = − .60, p b .01), joy and surprise are signifi-
cantly positively correlated (Spearman's rho = .19, p b .01), but anger
and surprise are not significantly correlated (Spearman's rho = .015,
p N .10).
More rigorously, we analyze how self-reported emotions impact
punishment intensity in the context of the Table 3 models. The estima-
tion in column (5) is similar to the model in column (1). The difference
is that we use only the treatments allowing self-reported emotions
(Waiting & Emotions and Virtual Punishment). Due to the significant cor-
relations noted above, we include only self-reported anger and surprise
ratings as co-variates inmodel (5). Recall that these emotion ratings are
specific to each of the other members of one's group. The final two col-
umns (6) and (7) report Heckit model estimates of the model (5) to
separate the effects of emotions on the decision to punish versus thelevel of punishment.12 Note that emotion ratings are not endogenous
in this specification of punishment choices given the timeline of choice
in each period (contributions, then emotion ratings when applicable,
then punishment choices). In columns (5)–(7), we use the Waiting &
Emotion treatment as the omitted category such that the estimates are
to be interpreted as effects on individual punishment choices relative
to theWaiting & Emotion treatment.
Results from the models in (5)–(7) of Table 3 indicate that anger
felt by i towards j significantly increases i's punishment of j. The
Heckit estimates indicate that anger increases the probability of
punishing but not the level of punishment. The level of punishment
is, however, significantly reduced in Virtual Punishment relative to
Waiting& Emotion (column (6)), which again offers evidence in support
of H1. Becausewe control for the emotional effect of anger on contribu-
tions, the fact that subjects still punish those who contribute less than
the remaining group average (i.e. free riders) is evidence of non-
impulsive punishment.13 This type of punishment may be considered
rational, although it may contain a non-impulsive but still emotional
component.
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Fig. 5. Contribution over time per treatment.3.4. The effects of venting emotions on contributions and welfare
Finally, we now turn to treatment differences in contribution levels to
examine whether venting emotions influences cooperation and, ulti-
mately, efficiency (payoffs). Fig. 5 displays individual contributions by pe-
riod, averaged across groups, in each treatment. Alternatively, Fig. 6
shows the distributions of contributions pooled across all periods for
each treatment. Average individual contributions are highest in Waiting
(15.19 ± 5.56 ECU), followed by Baseline (13.89 ± 6.08 ECU), then
Waiting & Emotion (11.60 ± 7.39 ECU) and finally Virtual Punishment
(9.25 ± 7.13 ECU). Nonparametric tests show a significantly lower level
of contributions in Virtual Punishment compared to Baseline for the final
five periods (p = .06). Other significant differences emerge with the
more controlled econometric analysis below to support our next result.0
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Fig. 6. The frequency of contResult 4a. While the simple cooling off period may increase contributions,
additional opportunities to vent emotions reduce contributions.
As support for this result, we estimate several regressions in Table 5
in which the dependent variable is the individual contribution of player
i. The independent variables include treatment dummies, a time trend, a
Final Period dummy, period*treatment interactions in models (4)–(6),
and demographic controls (suppressed for space considerations).
Models (1) and (2) do not account for censored data, while
(3)–(4) do. Models (2) and (4) replicatemodels (1) and (3), respective-
ly, using only the emotion venting treatments. Results in models
(1)–(4) tell a consistent story of reduced contributions in the emotion
venting treatments, with the greatest reduction in Virtual Punishment.
Recall that the venting emotion treatments also decreased punishment,
and the progressive pattern of these effects indicates that more oppor-
tunities to vent emotions lead to even fewer contributions as well as
(or, as a result of) even less punishment.
The estimates in model (5) of Table 5 examine significance of the
possible nonlinear effects across periods. We interact Period and
Period-squared with each of the emotion venting treatments and
find evidence of nonlinear effects in Waiting and Waiting & Emotion.
Contributions are estimated to initially increase but then decrease,
while the opposite pattern is estimated for Waiting & Emotion. The de-
cline in contributions across periods is linear for Virtual Punishment.
While we have no formal explanation for these differences in contribu-
tions across periods for eachof the emotion venting treatments,we note
that the coefficients in model (5) imply a lower level of contributions in
Wait & Emotion and Virtual Punishment compared to Baseline. These
effects on contributions due to emotion venting are nevertheless only
part of what determines efficiency, as we will see.
In addition to the general link between punishment and contribu-
tions, reduced contributions in Waiting & Emotions and Virtual Punish-
ment may also result from a differential impact of a given level of
punishment across treatments. To explore this possibility and the
dynamics of contributions, we estimated the magnitude of some0
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Table 5
Determinants of contributions.
Models RE GLS RE GLS RE Tobit RE Tobit RE Tobit
Treatments → All All except baseline All All except baseline All
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Waiting 1.30
(1.38)
– 1.47
(1.56)
– −1.17
(2.01)
Waiting & Emotion −2.61*
(1.42)
−3.74**
(1.62)
−3.03*
(1.56)
−4.27**
(1.83)
1.20
(2.03)
Virtual Punishment −4.81***
(1.50)
−5.89***
(1.60)
−5.45***
(1.58)
−6.76***
(1.81)
−0.23
(1.92)
Period 0.27***
(0.05)
0.16**
(0.07)
0.25***
(0.06)
0.11
(0.08)
0.89**
(0.37)
Period-squared −0.04
(0.03)
Period*Waiting 1.07*
(0.55)
Period-squared*Waiting −0.08*
(0.05)
Period*Waiting & Emotion −1.58***
(0.56)
Period-squared*Waiting & Emotion 0.12**
(0.05)
Period*virtual Punishment −0.88***
(0.34)
Period-squared*Virtual punishment −0.001
(0.003)
Final period −1.90***
(0.57)
−1.82**
(0.73)
−2.14***
(0.55)
−2.20***
(0.73)
−1.513**
(0.68)
Constant 20.57***
(4.55)
22.74***
(4.80)
21.69***
(4.83)
24.94***
(5.54)
19.64***
(4.89)
Observations 1080 720 1080 720 1080
***Significant at the 0.01 level, **at the 0.05 level, and *at the 0.1 level. Demographics are included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.influences on changes in individual contributions between periods t and
t + 1, (cit+1–cit), in separate random-effect GLS regressions (see
Appendix A online, Table A3). The difference in contributions is used in-
stead of the level of contributions in t+ 1 to avoid autocorrelation and
endogeneity concerns.We conducted the estimations separately for the
participants who contribute less than average of the other players −i
(designated as low contributors), and for those who contribute more
than the players−i average (high contributors) in period t. We control
for the difference between i's own and others' average contributions as
well as the level of contribution of player i in period t. Finally, we control
for punishment given and received in period t, as well as interactions
between the punishment points received and emotion venting
treatments.
Significant predictors of (cit+1–cit) in these estimations include a ro-
bust negative and significant coefficient across models on the deviation
between one's own contribution and the remaining group average in
period t, cit−c−itð Þ . Secondly, the estimates show that punishment
points received in period t significantly increase subsequent contribu-
tions but only for designated low contributors.14 This impact of punish-
ment on subsequent contributions are similar across treatments except
inWaitingwhere it is even higher, but again the effect is limited to low
contributors. Together these findings indicate that the lower (or at least
similar) contribution levels in the emotion-venting treatments cannot
be explained by lower punishment impact. Rather, they result from
the fact that individuals punish less when emotion venting is present.
Given that emotion venting is associated with reduced punishment
as well as reduced contributions, it is of interest to examine the net14 This last finding differs from the one reported in Masclet et al. (2003), Cinyabuguma
et al. (2006), Ones and Putterman (2007), and Page et al. (2008). They find that punished
high contributors reduce their contributions on average. Our estimations include addition-
al control variables that others donot (e.g., controlling for the level of contributions).How-
ever, when we re-estimate our Table 3 models using only co-variates typical in other
studies in the literature, our results still differ. We have no explanation of this difference,
but we do note that the effect on high contributors in the previous literature is generally
not as robust as the effect on low contributors.effect of emotion venting on welfare or payoffs. In other words, does
the reduction in costly punishment from emotion venting treatments
offset the reduced earnings due to lower contribution levels? Final
mean payoff amounts are: 21.95 ± 8.7 ECU (Baseline); 24.51 ± 7.19
(Waiting); 22.12 ± 8.41 ECU (Waiting & Emotion); and 22.87 ± 5.40
ECU (Virtual Punishment). While these differences are not statistically
significant in simple nonparametric tests (p N .10), we further explore
thepossibility that the nonlinear effects of emotion venting on contribu-
tionsmay lead to differential welfare effects in the early versus the later
periods of play (see Appendix A online Figure A3).
In Table 6, the dependent variable in each randomeffectmodel is the
final payoff of subject i in the decision period,which is the net of punish-
ment costs. Model (2) includes period*treatment interaction terms.
Rather than estimating similar models with nonlinear period effects,
we include models (3) and (4), which simply re-estimate the model
in (1) for the initial four periods (model (3)) and for the final 6 periods
(model (4)). The selection of period 4 as the cutoff point to separate
models (3) and (4)was to highlight thepoint in the 10-round treatment
where we estimate a switch away from a net welfare improvement in
Virtual Punishment (i.e., the early periods only) to a net welfare im-
provement in Waiting.15 In other words, a curious result in Table 6,
model (2) is that both theWaiting and Virtual Punishment improve wel-
fare in the punishment VCM games. However, the negative and signifi-
cant Period*Virtual Punishment interaction indicates that the positive
welfare effect is short-lived. While the model (2) Period*Waiting inter-
action does not indicate a period-specific welfare improvement in
Waiting, the estimates in models (3) and (4) indicate that its welfare15 In other words, the choice of where to divide the sample for this analysis is arbitrary
andwe use period 4mainly for illustrative purposes. A graph of average payoff differences
between venting treatments and the Baseline across periods clearly shows the systematic
decline in the welfare improvements of Virtual Punishment across periods. This is not
meant to imply that period 4 is somehow special in all VCM punishment games. The illus-
tration of this point is less clear if one uses nonlinear interaction terms in themodel (as in
Table 5 with contributions).
Table 6
Determinants of final payoffs (random-effects GLS models).
All periods All periods Periods 1–4 Periods 5–10
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Ref Ref Ref Ref
Waiting 2.14*
(1.27)
2.47*
(1.37)
1.66
(1.33)
2.45*
(1.36)
Waiting & Emotion 0.83
(1.35)
−0.48
(1.92)
−0.65
(1.73)
1.77
(1.43)
Virtual Punishment 2.26*
(1.16)
6.30***
(1.43)
4.27***
(1.22)
0.89
(1.41)
Period*Waiting −0.048
(0.14)
Period*Waiting & Emotion 0.22
(0.25)
Period*Virtual Punishment −0.78***
(0.19)
Contribution 0.32***
(0.06)
0.27***
(0.06)
0.18***
(0.07)
0.35***
(0.089)
Period 0.83***
(0.09)
0.98***
(0.12)
1.67***
(0.25)
0.50***
(0.13)
Last period −4.5***
(0.73)
−4.59***
(0.73)
−3.44***
(0.77)
Constant 14.32***
(2.74)
14.54***
(2.76)
12.05***
(3.81)
17.85***
(4.16)
Observations 1080 1080 432 648
Number of subjects 108 108 108 108
Note: ***Significant at the 0.01 level, **at the 0.05 level, and *at the 0.1 level. Robust stan-
dard errors are in parentheses.effects are strongest after the initial rounds. Our final result is the
following.
Result 4b. Net welfare improvements are significant in Waiting and
Virtual Punishment. However, the welfare improvement in Virtual
Punishment is only in the initial periods, while it is in the later periods in
the Waiting treatment.
While Gächter et al. (2008) show that the benefits of sanctions may
increase over a long-term interaction, our experiment does not compare
punishment against a no-punishment benchmark. Rather, our results
indicate a possible welfare improvement beyond what one might
achieve in a benchmark punishment institution if there is a cooling off
period to allow the hot-emotional state to subside. Our results do indi-
cate, however, that the long run benefits of emotion venting are more
likely with a simple cooling off period rather than allowing too much
emotion to vent. Too much emotion ventingmay overly limit the initial
punishment investments necessary to promote sustained contributions
in the long run. Consistentwith hypothesis H4 (and the Yerkes–Dodson
law), there appears to be a welfare benefit to venting some, but not all,
emotions prior to making a punishment choice. The retention of some
emotionmay benecessary to preserve an individual desire to personally
punish (Duersch and Müller, 2013) that is separate from desire for free
riders to be punished, in general (i.e., by someone else who will incur
the deterrence costs).
4. Conclusion
Emotions often contribute to decision making, and social dilemmas
represent a common class of decision environments where norm
enforcement may involve punishment. We designed an experiment to
study the effects of venting emotions on punishment and contributions
in a classic social dilemma setting—the Voluntary ContributionsMecha-
nism. Our Baseline treatment is a standard VCM game with monetary
sanctions as the norm enforcement tool. Our contribution to the litera-
ture is the addition of several treatments which vary the degree to
which a subjectmay vent her emotions prior to assigning costly punish-
ment points to others. We start by adding a 5-minute cooling off
period in the Waiting treatment. The Waiting & Emotions treatmentadditionally allows subjects to express their emotional states through
self-reported emotion ratings. Our most comprehensive treatment, Vir-
tual Punishment, additionally allows non-binding virtual (and confiden-
tial) punishment points to be assigned prior to the cooling off period.
We find robust effects whereby emotion venting both reduces pun-
ishment and increases contribution levels compared to our Baseline
with no emotion venting. Because these effects impact final payoffs dif-
ferentially, the net welfare effect of emotion venting is of particular in-
terest. In short, our results indicate that it may be most efficient to
allow a cooling off period so that emotions, which can lead to inefficient
levels of irrational punishment, may dissipate. Emotions in the VCM en-
vironment are generated by generous contributions or free riding of
others (Table 4), and this causally impacts one's own contribution and
punishment choices (Drouvelis andGrosskopf, 2014; Joffily et al., 2014).
Punishment is at its lowest when multiple avenues are present to
vent emotions in Virtual Punishment, but this may not be welfare im-
proving, in general. Here, net improvements towelfare are only present
in the initial decision periods as low punishment levels seem to precip-
itate a drop in contributions in later periods. Thus, implementing emo-
tion venting in away similar to Virtual Punishmentmay only be effective
in limited or one-shot interactions.Wefind longer termwelfare benefits
of emotion venting in the most simple emotion venting treatment that
uses a cooling off period (Waiting). Some, but not all, emotions
(e.g., anger at free-riding) are vented in this treatment. Perhaps most
importantly, the cooling off period results are consistent with the elim-
ination of impulsive and excessive punishment, which is likely the least
desirable type of punishment from a welfare perspective. Our more
complete emotion venting treatments may vent too much emotion,
leading to inefficiently low levels of punishment (i.e., inefficiently low
deterrence).
These results are consistentwith existing theories and discussions of
the arousal–performance relationship (e.g., Yates, 1990; Lazarus, 1991;
Kaufman, 1999; Forgas, 1995). In general, the probable mechanism be-
hind the Yerkes–Dodson law suggests that emotion is necessary for en-
gagement and motivation (Forgas, 1995), but excessive emotions
impede rational decision making (Kaufman, 1999; Lazarus, 1991). Our
results also highlight the importance of the performance horizon. We
find that the highest level of emotion venting may be optimal only for
short-term (one-shot?) environments, which suggests that longer-run
social dilemma interactionsmay benefit from a higher level of emotions
so that punishment is not overly limited. Future research on punish-
ment in VCM environments maywish to directly test whether the tran-
sition point for net welfare gains varies predictablywith emotion levels.
We do not vary punishment prices in our design, and so a limitation
of our study is that we do know to what extent our results may be sen-
sitive to punishment prices. Lower punishment prices may increase the
punishment threat in a way similar to higher emotion levels (for a fixed
punishment price). This likely benefits net welfare over longer time ho-
rizons. Also, results in Anderson and Putterman (2006) indicate that the
demand for punishment may be more elastic for lower punishment
prices than for high punishment prices (and the punishment price we
use would be considered intermediate). Thus, high punishment prices
may imply relatively little room for reduced punishment, but it is un-
clear how venting emotion may interact with punishment price chang-
es. Future research may wish to examine these interaction effects.
Our research implies that the common advice suggesting one should
take time to cool off and not make decisions while in the heat of emo-
tions may hold wisdom in the realm of social dilemmas and norm en-
forcement. While others have shown that punishment institutions can
be welfare improving, we also find the potential for additional benefits
by allowing for the venting of one's emotions. Any opportunity to re-
move one from an overly hot emotional state implies that choices are
more likely to be tempered with deliberate and rational thoughts.
Such findings have several implications. For example, norm or law en-
forcement with immediate punishment is not advisable, even when
the party is clearly guilty. Behavioral compliance of children may also
provide some public good benefits, but parents themselves may often
need the “time out” before discipline is handed out. The implications
are not restricted to the realm of public good provision. Consider an
emotion-based email that is regrettably sent in the heat of themoment.
The use of a forcedwaiting period prior to sending the email can be ben-
eficial. Some email programs currently allow the user to establish rules
that include the ability to wait several minutes after clicking “send” be-
fore themessage is actually sent.16 In other words, optimal responses or
optimal punishment requires an optimal level of emotion, which may
require some venting.
Regarding theoretical implications, it appears relevant to continue
the trend of formalizing how emotionsmay impact choice. For example,
dual system frameworks for choice allow for both rational and emotion-
al inputs to a decision (e.g., Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977; Camerer et al,
2005; Kahneman, 2011). Whether any differences exist between posi-
tive versus negative emotional arousal and performance, and how emo-
tion levels may interact with other theoretical parameters (e.g., beliefs,
trust, fairness parameters, etc.) would be useful avenues for future the-
oretical research on the relationship between emotions and reason. Our
research also has experimental methodology implications for related
public goods research—both the time lag between contributions and
punishment decisions, as well as formal or informal (or unintentional)
opportunities to express emotion will likely decrease punishment
significantly.
We do not wish to imply that emotions are irrational, but impulsive
decisions dominated by emotions may be rash or regrettable or lead to
inefficiencies. This research suggests that there is value to preserving
the level of emotion necessary to retain a personal preference for justice
against free-riders, because costly punishment may be otherwise
underprovided relative to efficient levels. In the end, this research
showswhere fruitful efforts may be directed in the future study of emo-
tions, norm enforcement, and efficiency.
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